



The Politics of Exclusion at the Sub-National Level: A Case of Uasin Gishu County, Kenya

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How to cite this paper: Ajwang, N.W.O. (2024) The Politics of Exclusion at the Sub-National Level: A Case of Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. *Open Access Library Journal*, 11: e11947. <https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1111947>

Received: July 14, 2024

Accepted: August 26, 2024

Published: August 29, 2024

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Abstract

After close to 50 years of independence, Kenya shifted from a unitary-state to a quasi-federal state system. Devolution of political and economic power to Counties each with its own elected governor, assembly, Member of National Assembly and Senator, is at the heart of this concept. Kenya is a multi-ethnic society with communities moving and settling in Counties other than their ancestral homes. Against a background of competitive national politics synonymous with ethnic rivalries and exclusion, the study identified various forms of exclusion facing migrant communities at the sub-national level. Migrant communities face exclusion in social, political and economic spheres.

Subject Areas

Politics

Keywords

Counties, Devolution, Exclusion in Kenya, Migration, Sub-National

1. Introduction

This study focuses on the politics of exclusion at the sub-national level in Kenya. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), social exclusion has become one of the most frequently discussed topics in the social sciences [1]. This study focuses on exclusion in Uasin Gishu (UG) County, which is located in the Rift Valley (RV) of Kenya. The Republic of Kenya lies on the eastern coast of sub-Saharan Africa [2] [3].

UG is one of the forty-seven counties in the country. It is a cosmopolitan county that is prone to ethnic conflicts over resources. It is located mid-west of the RV and borders six counties namely, Elgeyo-Marakwet to the east, Trans Nzoia to the north, Kericho to the south, Baringo to the south-east, Nandi to the

south-west and Bungoma and Kakamega to the west [4]. The county is made up of three districts, namely, Eldoret West, Eldoret East, and Wareng (see **Figure 1**). The pre-dominant settlement pattern however is rural in nature. This is reflected also by a total rural population of around 64.1% as compared to urban population of 35.9 % as indicated in the county report [5].



Figure 1. Map of Uasin Gishu County's districts. Source: [6].

The population of the county has been increasing over time [7] [8]. According to the county report, at an inter-censal population growth rate of 3.8%, the population growth rate is higher than the national growth rate, which is at 2.9% [Uasin Gishu County, 2013]. In addition, the population density is 267 persons per square kilometer (sq. km²). Good climate, varied topography, reliable rain-

fall and proximity to surface water are appealing natural characteristics that have frequently attracted in-migration into the county. In addition, amenity-rich urban locations (urbanicity) have become attractive to individuals searching for places to recreate, live, or retire [9]-[11].

The country is divided into 47 counties headed by an elected Governor. The population of the counties is made up of a dominant ethnic group with presence of other ethnic groups as minorities. This heterogeneous setup leads to ethnic exclusion in the sharing of resources in the counties. The county is one of the most cosmopolitan in Kenya and a home to all the ethnic groups of the Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic extraction [11]. The Nilotic Nandi (Kalenjin) and Nilotic Keiyo (Kalenjin) are dominant in Eldoret East, with the Nilotic Marakwet (Kalenjin) along the boundary with Elgeyo-Marakwet County. The Nandi, Luhya (Bantu) and Kikuyu (Bantu) are distributed within Eldoret West, while the Nandi and Kikuyu are dominant in Wareng. The Kalenjin (Arror, Bung'omek, Cherangany, Dorobo, El Molo, Endo, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Ogiek, Saboat, Samor, Senger, Sengwer, Terik, Tugen, Pokot, and Endorois) are the predominant group in the County. The county is composed of other ethnic groups like the Luo (Nilotic), Somali (Cushitic), Turkana (Nilotic), Maasai (Nilotic), Kisii (Bantu), Kamba (Bantu) and other Kenyan ethnic groups [4].

The non-indigenous ethnic groups migrated to UG as farm and railway workers, businesspersons, and workers in the agro-based industries [11]. Most of the migration into the RV in general and UG in particular by most non-indigenous ethnic groups, is relatively recent, only dating back to the first few years after independence in 1963, when farms formerly occupied by colonial white settlers were bought by, or given back to, indigenous (native) Africans. There are also people of Indian (Asian), European and Boer (South African) origin living in urban areas.

The county is in proximity to Kenyan border and lies on the Trans-African international trunk road (Northern Corridor road network), which connects Kenya and Uganda's capital, as well as South-Sudan [5]. In addition, it is connected by railway from the port of Mombasa through Nairobi to Uganda and has an international airport. The transport network to the Great Lake regions has increased the presence of people of Ugandan, South-Sudanese, Rwandese, Burundian, and Congolese origin. Their presence has been compounded by the presence of refugees in the country from some of the countries with a history of conflicts. The cosmopolitanism is well demonstrated in the whole county in both rural and urban areas- Eldoret, Turbo and Burnt Forest.

The County has a high dependency ratio and a high potential for a labour force [5]. There is limited access to formal employment in the county and this has resulted in the rapid increase of unemployment and underemployment. The majority of the youth in the County are dependent due to limited employment and income generating opportunities [11]. The county has a poverty gap of 6.0 percent, which is 33.5 percent of the total population of 867,712 [12].

The county is among the country's most "land-rich" area and agriculture or

mixed farming (crop, fish farming, and livestock rearing, mainly in the form of dairy farming) is the mainstay of the economy [13]-[15]. Farming is predominantly carried out on large-scale holdings, although there are areas under small farm settlement schemes. The main economic activities within the county are large and small-scale maize and wheat farming, and dairy farming. Other crops grown include sunflower, pyrethrum, potatoes, barley farming, and forestry. The forestry resources comprise indigenous forests and exotic plantations [9]. Commerce, tourism (sports tourism), tertiary services, and industry also form part of the economy of the county. The manufacturing industries located in the county are mainly agro-based or agro-processing. They include textiles, wheat, pyrethrum, milk, and corn.

The county had been peaceful for a period of time but factors such as political competition, resource ownership and management have triggered a series of conflicts within the area [16]. Tribal conflicts have rocked the county in different periods [17] the most recent being the Post-Election Violence (PEV) in the year 2008, which had a severe negative impact on UG [18]-[21].

2. Inequality in Kenya

Inequality and social exclusion and inclusion are issues that have become paramount in development literature over time. The majority of people in Kenya are poor and many live below the poverty line [22]. In the early years of independence, slain Kenyan politician Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, described Kenya as a country of 10 millionaires and 10 million beggars. Despite the policies put in place to banish poverty, support small and emerging enterprises, empower the youth and women economically, and support development in historically marginalized areas, the country remains highly un-equal [23].

The in-equality in Kenya has been blamed on the post-independence development blue print, the Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965 [24]. According to Society for International Development (SID), the paper increased inequality in the country [25]. From a purely economic standpoint, when resources are scarce and an economy is small, the most efficient means of attaining high levels of growth is to invest where the returns are highest as was proposed in the paper [26]. However, this had the effect of skewing the distribution of development expenditure in favor of those parts of the country (“White Highlands”) that had already benefited from the economic development of Kenya’s days as a Crown Colony. In addition, in most cases, the beneficiaries were members of the political elite who quickly entered the capitalist system (crony capitalism) and regions from which the dominant group in the new national elite hailed.

Capitalism has been blamed for the runaway disparity between the rich and the poor and has been vilified as a system that fleeces the masses to enrich a few even as it degrades the environment, perpetuates abuse of human rights and leads to the emergence of a severe individualistic society [27]. The political elite has perpetuated ethnic exclusion and partisan preferences together with clientelism in the country.

Clientelism has led to creation of “vote banks”. Consequently, favors are granted to those within that “vote bank” and clientage becomes the most important social relationship [28]. Moreover, the clients show extreme deference to their patron and the patrons then use their political influence to extend favors, by-passing or even violating laws, rules and norms and even resorting to extra constitutional means. The idea of satisfaction of personal and group interests via the state system is a defining feature of Kenya’s power-politics [29]. He writes that this emerged in the pre-independence era where those intermediaries who operated within the colonial system were allowed to gain concessions from their positions, both for themselves and for their specific tribes.

In Kenya, immediately after independence, there developed an elite capitalist class where substantial personal wealth, however acquired, seemed to be a condition of success in politics [30]. Furthermore, public officials, particularly as they climbed up the ladder, were measured by the degree they led affluent lives -the more ostentatious the official was, the more esteem he would garner. In addition, electoral campaigns often involved the candidates displaying their bountiful nature by giving large cash donations at local fund raisings (*Harambees*). Politics degenerated into a commercial outfit where a candidate’s success in electoral processes was predicated on one’s capacity and willingness to dish out bribes. Consequently, elections became exorbitantly expensive and have continued to be even more expensive today. This has excluded those with no financial means from participating or having a shot in the elections.

Politically this is viewed as an African capitalist breed that emerged under the wings of the government that was eager to control resources and key sectors of the economy through a process that was referred to as “Africanization” or “Kenyanization” of the economy [31]. The strategy involved the government playing an entrepreneurial role while facilitating the rise of African capitalists in the private sector. This also involved the requirement of Kenyans of Asian origin with British passports to apply for work permits in Kenya. This led to their massive immigration to the United Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere including Australia, New Zealand, United States of America (USA) and Canada, having fled targeted harassment. The process of Africanization has been seen as the root cause of the increase in tribalism especially in the manner in which jobs were acquired in the public service and in the manner in which other key positions in the state were filled [32].

The government further allowed public servants to be involved in private business even as they remained workers of the state. This marked the “legitimizing” of civil servants’ active involvement in business [33]. This resulted in civil servants doing business with the state, supplying goods and services, and hence resulting in massive corruption, theft, disregard for laws and abuse of public office. Consequently, they were able to undermine competition in the industries where they had interests. In addition, the state introduced “equal opportunity” kleptocracy where anybody could “eat”, as long as they were prepared to be a sycophant and to spread the loot.

In most cases, Kenya has had a regime under the control of an ethnic oligarchy that directly shapes the structure of access and hence influences the resultant inequalities in socio-economic life [34]. Those with political power concentrate on the promotion of the economic interests of their kinsmen and allies and play factions against each other [31]. The accession to power by a leader from a particular ethnic community has created the “political and economic orphans” of the former leader and in turn ushered in a new elite’s “turn to eat syndrome” from the ethnic community of the new leader [35]. This is what French political scientist Jean-François Bayart refers to as the “politics of the belly” [29]. This politics of patronage is said to benefit some elites at the expense of those who occupy disadvantaged positions in local patronage networks, inclining the latter to resist [36]. This is true across most African countries, where there is prevalence of patronage networks that operate within an ethnic context and coupled with “political tribalism”—mobilization of ethnicity for narrow instrumental ends. Kenya has had its fair share of political exclusion.

3. Exclusion and Ethnicity

According to The Equal Rights Trust (ERT) the use of ethnicity in politics has resulted in unequal development in the country leading to discrimination and inequality in areas such as employment, education and access to goods and services with the state as a discriminator and creator of inequality [37]. It reports that there is an intersection between poverty and discrimination in Kenya which arises with respect to ethnicity. ERT notes that Kenya’s pre- and post-independence politics have been dominated by ethnicity, as “wielders of political office have often afforded different and pre-ferential treatment in making appointments to public positions, in allocating public land and other resources, skewed development of regions, and reward those who vote for them with greater land, funding or infrastructure investment. This has resulted in inequality in various ways.

In Kenya this is reflected in regional inequality. Ethnicity is seen as the reason for the rising inequality. The regional or geographic differences in well-being may mean ethnic differences in well-being as ethnic groups often reside in given geographical regions [25]. In addition, there are stark differences in development opportunities and outcomes across Kenya’s rural-urban divide, and other regions too. For example, SID’s research found that 10% of households in urban areas account for about 39% of income while those in rural areas account for 41%, whereas the bottom 10% of households in both urban and rural areas account for about 1% of income. The organization also found out that unemployment rates are higher in urban areas than in the rural areas, almost three times over for the very young (15 - 29 years) and the very old (from 50 years) in the labour force.

Further regional statistics from SID indicate that, there are more people unemployed in Nairobi, Coast, Western and North Eastern provinces than in Central, Nyanza and Rift Valley. Land is considered as high potential or low poten-

tial in Kenya based on crop agriculture. As a result, ASALs are considered as low potential areas and this includes all of North Eastern province and parts of the Rift Valley, Eastern and Coast Provinces. SID further notes that about 1% of households in North Eastern province have water piped to their houses compared to about 12% in Central province and about 33% in Nairobi. It found out that access to electricity varies with Nairobi as the only province where there are more people with electricity than those without, at 71% and 29% respectively, even as eight out of ten households in Turkana County are lit using firewood. Generally, 4.6% of residents in rural areas have electricity compared to about half of the residents in urban areas.

In terms of income and wealth distribution, the country's top 10% of households control 42% of the total income while the bottom 10% control less than 1% [25]. SID's research found that wealthier groups in Kenya have generally better access to education than the poorer ones at 86% and 61% respectively. In addition, SID reports that access to water, and infant and mortality rates are lower among the wealthy groups and higher for poorer ones. There is a link between poverty and discrimination against women, persons with disability, ethnic minorities and members of other disadvantaged identity groups living [37]. In addition, it suggests that status-based discrimination is more likely to affect those from the poorest backgrounds, with lack of education, lack of access to resources and lack of political representation all playing a part.

SID was able to identify further disparities in the education sector with Central province gross enrolment rates in primary school being at 106% compared to only 18% in North Eastern Province, while for secondary education the two regions are about 38% and 5%, respectively. Primary school enrolment in Eastern is at 97% Nyanza 94%, Western 93%, Rift Valley 88%, Coast 72%, and Nairobi 52%. In Secondary education it found Eastern is to have 23% Nyanza 24%, Western 25%, Rift Valley 18%, Coast 14%, and Nairobi 12%. Prevalence and distribution of persons infected with HIV/AIDS varies across regions and genders as well. HIV infections are highest in Nyanza province, among both men and women, and lowest in North Eastern province, according to SID. It indicates that an average person in Central province's life expectancy is 64.2 while in Nyanza province it is only 44.8 years. Crime is high in Nairobi, Central and Rift Valley provinces. In addition, it found that more people are represented in Nairobi by the same MP than in Coast or North Eastern provinces. Finally, yet importantly, SID found gender inequality with women underrepresented in terms of employment, income distribution, education and political participation and most affected by HIV/AIDS.

4. Decentralization

In order to reduce increased inequality and deprivation in the country, the state has over a period of time adopted decentralization as a development strategy. It is the transfer of power, responsibilities, and finance from central government to

sub-national levels of government at provincial and/or local levels [38]. They note that decentralisation operates in three forms. One is the democratic decentralization, which is the transfer of power and resources to sub-national authorities that are both (relatively) independent of central government and democratically elected. Two is deconcentration (administrative decentralization) which is the transfer of authority to sub-national branches of the central state, often to line ministry officials based in local areas. Three, is fiscal decentralisation, which is the authority over budgets ceded to deconcentrated officials and/or unelected appointees or to elected politicians.

The country has progressively shifted from a centralized to a decentralized form of governance [39]. She notes that the paradigm shift was precipitated by the shortfalls that are often characteristic of highly centralized systems. She lists the shortfalls to include administrative bureaucracies and inefficiencies, misappropriation of public resources and the marginalization of local communities in development processes. In addition, the marginalization of communities in economic terms has been so perverse.

Consequently, a combination of deconcentration and devolution as forms of decentralization to local levels, operate simultaneously in the country [40]. The two lines are central government departments and local authorities, now county government. They are both linked to the colonial period. The government has devolved specific funds (fiscal decentralization) and decision-making authority to the local levels through this form of decentralization.

5. Exclusion in Uasin Gishu County

This study area is in UG County, which is located in the RV of Kenya. The history of politically instigated violence in the region has often led to destruction of property and deaths. This has been the case when politicians incite the indigenous communities against the new comers or migrants. Migrant communities have lost properties and investments at the behest of political incitement.

Admission into the security organs in the country is conducted based on regional quotas. Immigrant communities are discriminated against as their quota is said to be in their ancestral counties. This is reflected in other state job applications including in education and health. Similar obstacles occur in application for devolved funds. Migrant communities face discrimination in obtaining the funds. Indigenous communities are preferred to them.

In the political arena, the migrant communities are not in a position to competitively offer themselves for political office. Their election has been made difficult given gerrymandering of the constituency and civic seat boundaries. Boundaries are made in a design that disfranchises the migrant communities. Their geographic regions dominated by the migrant communities end up being curved and distributed in multiple constituencies. Their voting influence is thus reduced. They are often reminded that they do not belong to the county. Women and persons living with disability face even more hurdles because of patriarchy and discrimination.

6. Conclusions

Amidst reports of success in decentralization, it has to be reported that there are certain structural challenges that exclude migrant communities from fully having access to their constitutionally recognized privileges and rights. The funds are said to be enveloped with dishonor, conflicts, political interference, high turnover of staff, and corruption.

The nationally recognized discriminative policies not only affect the people at the sub-national level, but they encounter even more challenges as local administrators mimic what happens at the national level. Appointments into local political offices discriminate against the migrant communities.

It is my hope that the findings of the study, along with the several others on exclusion, will now stimulate greater interest in exclusion at the sub-national level line of inquiry. Further, the conclusions made in the study can be verified in different research areas in the country.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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